We document that credit rating changes significantly affect chief executive officer's (CEO's) incentives. Modeling both credit rating changes and CEO incentive changes as two jointly endogenous processes, we present strong evidence that CEO incentives increase subsequent to credit downgrades and, to a much weaker extent, decrease after credit upgrades. A one-notch downgrade in the credit rating improves CEO incentives by about 15%. We also find that the impacts of credit rating changes on CEO incentives are greater for firms with more distorted incentive contracts. Our analysis favors a corporate-governance-based argument and suggests that rating agencies', or more generally, debt-holders', monitoring complements equity-based incentive contracts to mitigate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.
Introduction
Much of our understanding of corporation is built on the idea that managers, if not properly motivated and closely monitored, may pursue goals that are not in shareholders' interests (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . One the one hand, the compensation literature emphasizes the role of equity-based incentive contracts in ameliorating the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders (see, e.g., the survey in Murphy, 1999) . Stock grants, stock option grants, managerial stock ownership, and other forms of equity-related pay schemes are arguably able to align managers' interests with shareholders' interests, but the effectiveness of equity-based incentives remains an open issue. On the other hand, finance theory has also well recognized the importance of debt to the agency problem of equity (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Myers 1977, 1984) . Supporting theoretic predictions, empirical studies have found that the choice of capital structure and debt maturity structure can be effective tools to monitor management and boost firm performance (see, e.g., Rajan and Winton, 1995; and Datta et al., 2005) .
At the confluence of the above two literatures, we provide in this paper an empirical analysis of how credit rating changes interact with CEO incentives to mitigate the agency problem. To our knowledge, this paper is the first study that connects credit ratings to executive compensation and CEO incentives. Most studies on credit ratings examine either their information content (e.g., Ederington, Yawitz and Roberts, 1987; Goh and Ederinton, 1993; Kliger and Sarig, 2000;  Odders-White and Ready, 2006) or their impact on firm financing decisions (Faulklender and Petersen, 2006; and Kisgen, 2006 ). Here we analyze the impact of credit rating changes on corporate governance devices to bond management to interest of shareholders. Specifically, we model changes in credit ratings and changes in CEO incentives as two jointly endogenous processes, and we use the difference-in-difference (DD, hereinafter) estimation method along with different model specifications to address the endogeneity issue. We hypothesize and provide robust empirical evidence that credit rating changes significantly affect CEO incentives. We find that the impacts of credit rating changes on CEO incentives are much larger for firms having more distorted CEO incentive contracts than for firms with less distorted CEO incentive contracts, suggesting that the monitoring role of credit rating agencies supplements corporate governance mechanisms in place to incentivize managers to work for the interest of shareholders.
Our motivation is two fold. At the anecdotal level, credit ratings appear to have real importance and the importance appears to have grown over time. Graham and Harvey (2001) , in their survey of the American CFOs, report that credit rating is an executive's second most important concern when deciding financing policies. As argued in Bertand and Mullainathan (2003) , corporate executives enjoy a "quiet" life. Thus, changes in credit ratings, especially rating downgrades, disturb such a "quiet" life, and may result in significant changes in CEO incentives. Take as one example.
The cuts in debt ratings of U.S. auto giants, General Motors Corp. (GM) and Ford Motor Co.
(Ford), to junk status in 2005 triggered a major overhaul of corporate strategies and operational efficiencies of both companies; Ford hired Alan Mulally as its new CEO and president on September 5, 2006, succeeding Bill Ford, Jr., to take over "The Way Forward" restructuring plan at Ford to turn-around its massive losses and declining market share. 1 On the theoretic front, various corporate finance models yield implications for credit rating changes to affect CEO incentives as well. In one aspect, credit rating changes may trigger/relax some corporate governance devices. A rating change affects the likelihood of a CEO losing his job and firm-specific human capital investment as well as hurting his reputation in the labor market. To retain the private benefits derived from the control of the firm, the CEO may adjust his incentive levels accordingly. More importantly, rating agencies' monitoring may complement equity-based pay schemes and other corporate governance mechanisms in place to discipline the CEOs. Credit downgrade may trigger a more effective use of corporate governance mechanisms such as incentive pay. Meanwhile, a reduced dependence on equity-based incentives might arise from rating upgrades because upgrades signal good CEO performance and, hence, likely less severe managerial agency problems. Credit ratings changes thus may affect CEO incentives through those "corporate governance" channels. Second, the standard principal-agent models also implies potential links between managerial incentives and credit rating changes. Credit downgrades (upgrades) reflect increase (decrease) in firms' risk exposure, which, according to the standard riskincentive tradeoff argument, tends to reduce (increase) managerial incentives. In addition, credit rating downgrades/upgrades are well-known information events, disseminating valuable information to the capital market, which shareholders can leverage to better structure managerial incentive contracts.
Although both anecdotes and corporate finance theories suggest that changes in credit ratings may affect CEO incentives, rigorous empirical studies lack. In this paper, we try to fill in the gap by unravelling the dynamics between changes in credit ratings and changes in CEO incentives. Our analysis yields several key findings. We find that credit rating changes have significant effects on CEO incentives measured as pay-performance sensitivity. Credit rating downgrades significantly improve CEO incentives and, to some extent, credit rating upgrades reduce CEO incentives. Our findings are potentially consistent with the aforementioned corporate-governance-based argument.
We conduct several cross-sectional analyses to examine through which channels credit rating changes affect CEO incentives. Controlling for cross-sectional variations in firm-specific attributes such as firm size, credit rating level, degree of information asymmetry and presence of institutional investors in the benchmark period, we find robust empirical evidence that the impact of credit rating changes on CEO incentives is concentrated on firms which have the most distorted incentive contracts. 2 The distortion is measured by the degree in deviations of a firm's CEO incentive level from the optimal, or the "target", level in cross-section. Our analysis shows that rating agencies' external monitoring helps manage the level of equity-based incentives and yields greater benefits for firms with higher agency costs. This finding, together with the evidence that proxies for information asymmetry, institutional presence and risk exposure fail to account for the effect of credit rating changes on CEO incentives, suggests that the monitoring of rating agencies, or more generally, of bondholders, complements equity-based incentive contracts and other corporate governance mechanisms in place to align interests of managers with interests of shareholders.
Our empirical study has an implication for the agency theory. The traditional principal-agent model focuses on the conflicts of interests on the equity side and abstracts from potential roles played by other stakeholders like creditors in this manager-shareholder dynamics. We empirically introduce a new element, the rating agency that represents the interest of creditors, into the traditional principal-agent framework. Allowing for a role of rating agencies (or bondholders) in this principal-agent framework appears to twist the dynamics of the principal-agent relation and yield important implications for equity-based incentives as one corporate governance device.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews literatures at the confluence of the credit rating literature and the CEO compensation literature. We then develop the hypothesis that maps out the dynamics between credit rating changes and CEO incentive changes. Section 3 describes data and the sample construction. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy and conducts specification tests on the empirical model. In particular, we explain in details how we cope with the endogeneity problem. Section 5 presents main empirical findings and several robustness checks. Section 6 offers cross-sectional analyses to better understand the main channel through which credit rating changes affect CEO incentives. Section 7 concludes.
Linking Credit Rating Changes to CEO Incentives
Firms' credit ratings reflect a rating agency's opinion of a firm's overall creditworthiness and its capacity to satisfy financial obligations. The ratings are determined by rating agencies' assessment of the probability distribution of future cash flows to bondholders, which in turn, depends on the future cash flows to firms. Thus, changes in credit ratings reflect changes in firms' fundamentals, especially their future cash flow distributions, and are common and well-disseminated information events (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001 ). Although facing heavy criticism in recent years for having missed such scandals as Enron, Worldcom, and Parmalat, credit ratings have been broadly embraced by financial markets because the levels and changes in credit ratings mostly predict the likelihood of defaults. As rating agencies largely represent the interest of debt-holders, we conjecture that, like debts, credit rating changes help to ameliorate the agency problems between managers and shareholders. 3 Incentive pay scheme is a widely-used mechanism to align interest of managers with that of shareholders, although the effectiveness of incentive pay remains the subject of a heated debate. Many firm-and industry-specific characteristics have been identified as important determinants of equity-based incentives. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no prior attempts have examined the CEO incentives at the confluence of the executive compensation literature and the credit rating literature.
Both corporate governance theories and traditional principal-agent models predict that credit 3 As far as debt is concerned, the literature has extensively examined the role of debt in resolving agency problems. E.g., Easterbrook (1984) argues that debt forces managers to be accountable to the external capital market. Lang and Stulz (1996) document evidence that debt curtails investment by firms with poor prospects. rating changes affect CEO incentives, but through different channels. Credit ratings reflect bondholders' assessment of firm bankruptcy probability. In the case of bankruptcy, the CEO may lose his private control benefits and firm-specific human capital investment (see, e.g., Eckbo and Thorburn, 2003) . The CEO may also find his reputation in the managerial market to be crippled (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b) . Therefore, the CEO's incentives, subsequent to credit rating changes, especially downgrades, will adjust accordingly. In addition, credit downgrades disturb or even terminate a CEO's quiet life, triggering more intensive use of corporate governance mechanisms such as equity-based incentive contracts. In the same reasoning, we expect a firm to relax its dependence on CEO incentive contracts after a credit rating upgrade because the demand for more effective monitoring may decrease as a result of good firm performance. 4 Thus, if this corporate-governance based argument is true, we would expect to observe increased (decreased) CEO incentives subsequent to credit downgrades (upgrades).
Besides the corporate-governance-based argument, traditional agency theories also predict a relation between credit rating changes and CEO incentives. As predicted by the standard principalagent models, there is a trade-off between risk and managerial incentives -firms are less likely to adopt equity-based incentives to motivate managers when the uncertainty level in the environment is high. Although the empirical support for this prediction is still inconclusive (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Core and Guay, 2002; and Prendergast, 2002) , most economists believe that some correlation exists between risk and incentives. Credit ratings changes signal changes in firms' risk profiles. A rating downgrade typically signals an increase in the likelihood of default and a rating upgrade predicts the converse. Therefore, we expect CEO incentives to change in response to credit ratings downgrades/upgrades. The agency theory also predicts that the principals are able to leverage all relevant available information to optimally design managerial compensation contracts (see e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; and Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) . The new information released through credit rating downgrades/upgrades helps refine the contracting environment and boosts CEOs' equity-based incentives.
The corporate-governance-based argument and the agency-theory-based argument jointly 4 To be more specific, in the case of rating upgrades, CEO incentives may decrease for two different reasons. First, it may be caused by lax monitoring subsequent to good operating performance; second, it is also possible that CEOs of upgrading firms can negotiate higher pays, which increases the risk of holding stocks or options. The CEOs thus may sell shares to balance the risk exposure, leading to reduced stock ownership and, hence, equity-based incentives.
describe the dynamics between credit rating changes and CEO incentive changes. The corporategovernance-based argument implies improvements (attenuations) in CEO incentives following credit downgrades (upgrades). The agency-theory-based risk-incentive tradeoff argument predicts that CEO incentives attenuate when risks increase following credit downgrades, and improve when risks decrease after credit upgrades. It remains an empirical issue to examine which argument is more likely to account for the effect of credit rating changes on CEO incentives.
Besides the overall impact of credit rating changes on CEO incentives, it is interesting to study what types of firms are more likely to experience significant changes in CEO incentives following credit rating downgrades/upgrades. Such cross-sectional analysis helps identify the main channels through which rating agencies affect CEO incentives. The cross-sectional variations in the impacts of rating changes on CEO incentives are arguably related to the cross-sectional differences in firm characteristics prior to the rating changes. These firm characteristics include firm size, firms' overall rating levels, the degree of information asymmetry, the presence of institutional investors, the degree of misalignment in CEO incentives, and so on. In particular, the literature recognizes the sub-optimality of the managerial contracting process because powerful CEOs can extract a large amount of rents from dysfunctional boards (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001 ; and Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) or because market frictions such as information asymmetry and/or costs of contract renegotiation impose constraints to achieve the optimality. Core and Guay (1999) document evidence that firms use equity grants to manage optimal equity-based incentive levels.
If the corporate-governance-based argument is mainly responsible for the relation between credit rating changes and CEO incentives, we expect that CEO incentives adjust in response to credit rating changes and that such adjustments are more pronounced among firms with more mis-aligned CEO incentives. firms (excluding unrated firms). For brevity we report the distribution based on the broad rating measure which includes the minus, middle, and plus specifications for a particular rating. That is, a broad rating of "AA" refers to firms with ratings of "AA+", "AA", and "AA-"; and similar for the other broad rating measures. The panel shows that the bulk (82.57%) of firms in our sample have credit ratings of "A", "BBB", and "BB", and that 71.86% of the firms have investmentgrade ratings, i.e., have broad rating categories "BBB" or above). Table 1 , Panel B reports the distribution of credit rating changes. We convert firms' credit ratings into the following numerical scales: 1 for "AAA", 2 for "AA+", 3 for "AA", 4 for "AA-", and so on until 22 for "D". Thus a positive (negative) change in the numerical scale represents a downgrade (upgrade) in credit ratings. Because it requires two consecutive observations to calculate credit rating changes, the sample reduces to 8,967 firm-year observations. Among them there are 1,174 downgrades, 795 upgrades, and 7,007 observations without changes. Both Panels A and B show a downward shift in the firms' credit ratings over time, consistent with the empirical evidence from the credit rating literature (see, e.g., Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay, 1998).
In this study we use the difference-in-difference (DD) method on a matched sample to estimate the impact of ratings changes on CEO incentives (see Section 4.1 for details on the DD estimation).
We view each rating change as one treatment received by a firm and define the event date by t.
The treated firms (or the subjects) are the firms going though rating changes; the untreated firms are the firms without receiving rating changes. The untreated firms serve as candidate control firms of the subjects. To be eligible for a control firm, we require an untreated firm to satisfy the following two conditions: 1) the untreated firm and the corresponding subject shall have the same credit ratings and are in the same two-digit industry in the year immediately prior to the event year, i.e., in year t − 1 which is the benchmark year; 5 and 2) the credit ratings of the untreated firm remain unchanged from year t − 1 to year t + 4, so that our estimation of the treatment effect is not contaminated by possible rating changes of the control firm in the estimation window other than the matching date t − 1 and the event date t. Given the pool of untreated firms that are matched to the subjects, we then randomly pick, for each subject, one control from the group of matched 
Variables
Two variables are key to this empirical study. We define the credit rating changes variable Change as a firm's numerical credit rating scale in year s minus its level in year s − 1. To reduce the impact of outliers, we delete from our sample the observations with the magnitude of rating changes larger than five notches. The results remain similar if we winsorize the variable at five. We measure CEO incentives by pay-performance sensitivity. We focus on stock-based incentives as various studies document that the equity-based incentives simply swamp incentive provisions due to changes in other compensation components like salary and bonus (Hall and Liebman, 1998; and Murphy, 1999) .
In a similar vein of spirits of Jensen and Murphy (1990) , we define the stock-based incentive (P P S) as the change in dollar value of the CEO's existing stock-based compensation (stock and stock 5 Here, we essentially treat the credit rating level as a sufficient statistic for firm characteristics and, thus, a score for matching. S&P's corporate rating methodology provides a framework that ensures all salient issues are considered. The credit analysis concerns both business risk and financial risk. The business analysis covers industry characteristics, competitive position and management. The financial analysis includes accounting quality, financial characteristics, financial policy, profitability, capital structure, cash flow protection, and financial flexibility, etc. options) per $1,000 change in the shareholders' wealth or firm value. Equivalently, 6 we calculate the stock-based pay-performance sensitivity (P P S) for firm i's CEO in time s as follows:
where OW N represents the incentive from CEO's stock ownership and is calculated as the ratio of the number of shares held (excluding options) to the number of company's shares outstanding;
OP T stands for the incentive from CEO's option holdings and is calculated as the ratio of the number of options held by the CEO to the number of company's shares outstanding times the hedge ratio delta of an option. We use Core and Guay's (1999) method to compute the option delta.
We control for firm characteristics such as size, stock return volatility, market-to-book ratio, level and concentration of institutional ownership, all of which are important determinants of crosssectional variations in CEO incentives. 7 We calculate firm size (SIZE) as the logarithm value of the market capitalization of common equity (data 25 times data 199) at fiscal year-end. We compute the annualized percentage volatility of stock returns (V OL) using the past five years of monthly stock return data. We obtain the market-to-book ratio (M T B) as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is equal to the market value of common equity plus the book value of assets (data 6) less the book value of common equity (data 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (data 74). We respectively calculate aggregate institutional holding (IN ST H)
as the total institutional share holdings in percentage of the total number of shares outstanding, and the concentrated institutional holding (IN ST C) as the top-five institutional share holdings in percentage of the total institutional share holdings. Table 2 reports the mean, standard deviation, and median of the characteristics for credit- 6 The change in value of a CEO's stock holdings for a given year is equal to the beginning-of-year value of his stock holdings multiplied by the year's stock return. For revaluation of a CEO's option portfolios, we adopt Core and Guay's (1999) method to compute the hedge ratio delta of each option and then multiply the option deltas by the change in the shareholders' wealth, adjusting for the percentage of stock shares represented by the options. We define the change in shareholders' wealth over a given year as the firm's beginning-of-year market value times this year's stock return.
7 See, e.g., Schaefer (1998) for research on firm size, Garen (1994), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) , and Jin (2002) for research on stock return volatility (risk), Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) for research on growth opportunity (market-to-book ratio), and Hartzell and Starks (2003) for institutional influence (level and and concentrated institutional ownership).
rating-change firms in the three-year period from one year before ratings changes (i.e. at t − 1) to one year after ratings changes (i.e. at t + 1). Panels A and B correspond to downgrading firms and upgrading firms, respectively. For downgrading firms from year t − 1 to year t + 1, their market capitalizations and market-to-book ratios decline slightly; their average stock return volatilities rise steadily from 34.3% to 40.8%; both the level and concentration of aggregate institutional holdings of these firms increase a bit; and their credit ratings deteriorate from a scale of 8 ("BBB+") to 10
("BBB-") in average value or 9 ("BBB") in median value. For upgrading firms from year t − 1 to year t + 1, their market capitalizations and stock return volatilities increase slightly; the market-tobook ratios and the level and concentration in institutional holdings remain virtually unchanged; their credit ratings improve by two notches, from a scale of 10 ("BBB-") to 8 ("BBB+"). Table 2 shows a clear pattern of changes in CEO incentives from the year before rating changes to the year after rating changes: for downgrading firms, the average CEO pay-performance sensitivities improve from 14.67 to 15.88 and both components of the CEO incentives, stock ownership and option-based incentive, increase monotonically over the period; in contrast, for upgrading firms, their average CEO pay-performance sensitivities fall from 24.39 to 19.77, and both CEO stock ownership and option-based incentive decline after upgrading.
Finally, because of different availability of these variables for the subjects and their corresponding controls, after merging all these data together, we obtain a balanced sample of 948 observations, or 474 pairs of observations, in which there are 275 downgrades and 199 upgrades, respectively. We conduct our empirical analysis using this balanced sample.
Empirical Method

Empirical strategy
A predominant specification in the literature to evaluate treatment effects is firm-year panel regressions, with which we assume that the levels of CEO compensations/incentives are driven by overstating the number of observations. Another issue associated with the firm-year panel regression is that the credit rating change is an endogenous variable, which is not easy to tackle in the panel regression setting.
Instead, in this empirical study we build on the difference-in-difference (DD) estimation method and use the changes specification at firm-level. That is, we compare the changes in CEO incentives for treated firms to the changes in CEO incentives for comparable untreated firms, controlling for the changes in firm characteristics that affect CEO incentives. All the changes are measured relative to the pre-treatment benchmark year t−1. This approach results in one pair of observations (treated firm and control firm) per firm event. Note that, as explained earlier, for each treated firm under observation we identify a control firm which comes from the same two-digit industry and has the same credit rating as the treated firm in year t − 1. We conjecture that credit rating changes have both an immediate impact and a lasting impact on CEO incentives, so we examine the impacts in two different horizons. We study the immediate treatment effects by focusing on the changes in CEO incentives in the year immediately after the rating change (i.e. t + 1) relative to the benchmark year. To study the lasting impact of rating changes on CEO incentives, we follow We measure CEO incentives by pay-performance sensitivities (P P S) and define ∆P P S as the average change in P P S in the one-year, two-year, three-year, and four-year periods after the credit ratings change minus P P S in year t − 1. We follow an analogous approach to calculate changes in firm characteristics as covariates of ∆P P S and lag these covariates by one year to be consistent with the empirical compensation literature. We specify our basic model as
Here, we control for changes in such firm characteristics as size (size), stock return volatility (vol), market-to-book ratio (mtb), aggregate institutional holding (insth) and concentrated institutional ownership (instc). Note that our firm-level changes specification automatically controls for firmfixed effects and/or CEO-fixed effects, such as the industry effect, year effect, CEO tenure, and firm age, that are also important determinants of CEO incentives. In this specification, the industry effect is cancelled out through differencing across time, and the time-related effects like year effect, CEO tenure, and firm age are reduced through differencing across time to enter equation (2) as one component of the intercept. In equation (2), the variable change measures the credit ratings change and the estimated coefficient β 1 is our primary coefficient of interest, capturing the impact of credit rating changes on CEO incentives. We test our hypotheses by examining the sign and significance of this estimated coefficient.
This econometric specification has two appealing features to our research questions. First, a changes specification cancels out any fixed and time-invariant firm-specific effects and allows for time-invariant unobservable differences between treatments and controls, thus alleviating concerns that such effects might be driving our results. Consequently, equation (2) is a parsimonious way to implicitly control for the endogeneity of change. Second, Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) propose that collapsing the multiple observations for each firm into a single observation yields more reliable inference than other specifications in DD-type estimations. We therefore stick to this basic specification throughout our empirical analysis. We also conduct our analysis using other model specifications for robustness check.
The specification in equation (2), to a certain extent, controls for the endogeneity of rating changes. However, given that a large empirical literature finds credit rating changes to be endogenously driven by a variety of factors, it is still necessary to control for the endogeneity of change explicitly and systematically. Thus, we take both change and ∆P P S as endogenous variables and form a system of simultaneous equations. We perform a two-stage least-square regression (2SLS) on the system. In our 2SLS regressions, the equation for ∆P P S follows equation (2), and we use instrument variables to specify the equation for change as:
where the variable z refers to a set of ten instruments, including the firm's level of credit rating in year t-1, lrate; firm size in year t-1, lsize; stock volatility in year t-1, lvol; the market-to-book ratio in year t-1, lmtb; the change of firm size from years t-1 to t, ∆size0; the change of market-to-book ratio from years t-1 to t, ∆mtb0; the change of the ratio of net income to total sales from years t-1 to t, ∆prof it0; the change of the ratio of total debt (long-term and short-term) to total equity from years t-1 to t, ∆lev0; the change of net-income-to-interest-expense ratio from years t-1 to t, ∆f cov0; and the change of stock volatility from years t-1 to t, ∆vol0. We choose the ten instrument variables based on both the credit rating literature and our specification test results.
Specification tests
The key to our empirical success in estimating the two simultaneous equations as specified in equations (2) and (3) is that we choose the various instrument variables, z, appropriately. Therefore, we conduct specification tests before we present our main empirical results.
In our 2SLS regressions, we first estimate equation (3) using the chosen instrument variables (first-stage), and then we estimate equation (2) (2) is generally much more difficult than the test of property (1). We follow Greene (2003, p414 ) to test property (2) . Specifically, in the second-stage, we run an auxiliary regression of the residuals from the second-stage estimation against all the exogenous variables and the instrument variables used in the IV estimation. We then calculate the χ 2 -statistic as the product of the sample size and the R 2 of the auxiliary regression to test the over-identifying restriction, where the number of over-identifying restrictions is equal to the number of the instrument variables minus the number of endogenous variables on the right-hand side of the equation in the second-stage estimation. If z and ε are uncorrelated, then we expect a very low R 2 of the auxiliary regression and hence an insignificant χ 2 -statistic. We start with a broad set of variables relevant to credit rating changes based on the credit rating literature, then we iteratively use the specification tests to narrow down our choice of instrument variables used in our empirical analysis. When the two specification tests yield results satisfying the two properties required for instrument variables, we end up with the choice of ten instruments as listed above. Table 3 presents the results on the specification tests given the chosen instrument variables.
To illustrate the difference between the OLS regression and the IV regression, we report the two regression estimation results in Panel A. The two estimation methods produce similar estimates and statistics for most of the parameters but the primary parameter of our interest. The OLS estimate for the parameter associated with Change is 1.767 with a standard error of 0.582 and is significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the IV estimate for this key parameter is 3.630 with a standard error of 1.530 and is significant at the 5% level. Given the endogeneity embedded in the simultaneous system of equations and the distinct difference in the two estimates, it is necessary for us to use the IV estimation method for our empirical analysis. Also, a Hausman's (1978) specification test yields a statistic with a p-value of 4.56%, rejecting the use of OLS regression and favoring the use of IV regression. Panel B reports the two specification test statistics of the IV estimation. The F -statistic of the first-stage regression is 25.64 with a p-value of 0, clearly rejecting the hypothesis that z and
Change are uncorrelated. The auxiliary regression of the second-stage estimation yields a R 2 of 0.0156. Given a sample size of 948, the χ 2 -statistic with a degree of freedom of 9 is calculated as 14.79, suggesting that the over-identifying restriction cannot be rejected at the 5% level. Combining the two specification test results, we conclude that our choice of instrument variables is appropriate and that our 2SLS estimation method is doing reasonably well in addressing the endogeneity issue.
Main Empirical Results
Do credit rating changes affect CEO incentives?
We perform the 2SLS estimation on the the set of equations comprised of equations (2) and (3). The first-stage regression is on equation (3) for the endogenous credit ratings change variable change using the set of instrumental variables specified in Section 4.1. The second-stage regression is on equation (2), replacing the variable change with its fitted value from the first-stage regression. To increase the efficiency of the estimations we estimate the two stages jointly; this is done by using the Stata command "ivreg". We adjust for hetereoscedasticity and clustering of firms when calculating robust standard errors of the estimates. For brevity, we report only the second-stage regression results in Table IV . 8 We examine the immediate impact of rating changes on CEO incentives. Table IV , Column (1) reports the result of CEO incentive changes (∆P P S) one year after the credit rating changes. We find that Change is significantly and positively related to change in CEO incentives (∆P P S), with a coefficient of 3.63 and an associated t-statistic of 2.37. A one-notch downgrade of a firm's credit rating (Change = 1) causes a $3.63 increase in its CEO's incentive level. The positive sign of the coefficient of Change also implies that a credit upgrade leads to decreased CEO incentives.
Note that the economic magnitude of the impact of credit rating change on CEO incentive level is significant. The median and mean of P P S in our sample are $7.663 and $24.291, respectively.
Thus a one-notch downgrade of firm credit rating improves CEO incentive level by 47.37% (14.94%) relative to the sample median (mean).
The effect of credit rating changes on CEO incentives may last several years. In Columns (2)- (4), we define ∆P P S as the average P P S over the two-year, three-year, and four-year periods after the credit rating changes minus P P S in year t-1, respectively. The explanatory variables in equation (2) are defined accordingly by lagging their averages by one year. E.g., ∆size in Column (2) is defined as the average firm size over the period from t to t+1 minus firm size in t-1, while 8 The first-stage regression results show that the rating changes, with positive and negative changes respectively representing downgrading and upgrading, are positively related to the risk level in the benchmark year and the changes in risk and leverage ratios from the benchmark year to the event (rating-change) year; the rating changes are negatively related to credit rating, firm size, and market-to-book ratio in the benchmark year and the changes in firm size and profit margin from the benchmark year to the event year. The other parameter estimates are statistically insignificant.
∆size in Column (3) is defined as the average firm size over the period from t to t+2 minus firm size in t-1. As a result, the coefficients on change capture the average effect of credit rating changes on CEO incentives over different post-treatment horizons. Again, we estimate equations (2) and (3) simultaneously, and we only report the second-stage regression results in Table IV . The estimated coefficients of change in Columns (2)-(4) are 4.073, 4.491, and 5.22, respectively. All of the estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level. We notice an increasing pattern in the magnitude of the coefficient of change across the three different post-treatment horizons, suggesting that the credit rating changes have a lasting impact on CEO incentives. Take the result from Column (3) as an example. A one-notch downgrade of a firm's credit rating level on average causes a $4.491 increase in its CEO's incentive, relative to its pre-rating-change level, over the three-year period after the credit rating change, which represents a 58.61% (18.49%) increase from the sample median (mean).
Given the lasting impact of rating changes on CEO incentives, for ease of exposition we focus the remainder of our discussions on the one-year and two-year periods immediately after the rating changes. Also, our focus on a two-year post-treatment horizon helps alleviate the concern that our results may be driven by firms experiencing series of rating changes in the horizon under study.
Everything else equal, the longer the horizon is, the more likely a firm's credit rating is subject to a change. With the shorter horizon we reduce the number of firms with multiple rating changes to be included into our study. We defer the further discussion about this problem to Section 5.2.
Robustness checks
Downgrading versus upgrading
The specification in equation (2) implicitly dictates that the impacts on CEO incentives are symmetric between downgrades (where change > 0) and upgrades (where change < 0). One may suspect whether the explanatory power of the variable change is solely driven by either upgrading firms or downgrading firms. In addition, our above approach uses linear probability models, which implicitly assumes that the average quality difference between any two adjacent ratings, such as AAA-and AA+, is the same as that between BBB-and BB+. Although no conclusive evidence has been documented that a conceptually superior probit model performs better than the linear probability model, 9 we employ a probit model to check the robustness of our findings.
We partition our samples into two sub-samples -one contains the downgrading firms and their control firms, and the other contains upgrading firms and their control firms. Instead of using change as a measure of credit rating changes, we define two dummy variables DOW N and U P .
DOW N (U P ) takes the value of 1 if Change > 0 (< 0) and zero otherwise. We modify the basic model in equation (2) as follows
To control for the endogeneity of DOW N and U P , we specify the following equation for the firststage regression:
where z is the same set of instrumental variables as specified in equation (3).
We fit the treatment-effects model using the Heckman's (1979) two-step consistent estimation method on the set of equations (4) and (5). The treatment-effects model considers the effect of an endogenously chosen binary treatment (DOW N or U P in our study) on another endogenous continuous variable (∆P P S in our study). We estimate a probit model on equation (5) in the first step and substitute the fitted probabilities for the treatment dummies in the secondstep estimation of equation (4). We use the Stata command "treatreg" to implement the estimation of the treatment-effects model, and we calculate robust standard errors by adjusting for hetereoscedasticity and clustering of firms.
We report the second-step estimation results in Table 5 , where we measure the average changes in CEO incentives in the post-event one-year and two-year periods relative to the benchmark level of CEO incentives. Columns (1)- (2) present the estimation results when we apply this model specification to the downgrading firms and their corresponding control firms. The estimated coefficients of DOW N are 4.683 and 6.295, respectively, and both are statistically significant at the 10% level. The result indicates that relative to the control firms, downgrading firms' CEO incentives tend to improve after the rating downgrades. Columns (1')-(2') report the second-step estimation results for the upgrading firms. In the year immediately after credit rating upgrades the estimated coefficient of U P is -6.97 and not statistically significant. Over the two-year period after credit rating upgrades the estimated coefficient of U P is -10.191 and is statistically significant at the 10% level. By separating credit rating changes into downgrading and upgrading, we find quite strong evidence that credit downgrades lead to increased CEO incentives and relatively weaker evidence that reduced CEO incentives follow credit upgrades.
An alternative model specification
The success of our empirical strategy hinges on whether we can successfully cope with the endogeneity of the credit rating changes. Besides the methods used above, we propose here an alternative model specification to offer further evidence that our results are robust. For each treatment firm under study, we compute the average change in P P S of the corresponding control firm over the same period, ∆P P Strend, and use ∆P P Strend as a regressor in the following specification:
∆P P S i = β 0 + β 1 P P Strend i + β 2 ∆size i + β 3 ∆vol i + β 4 ∆mtb i + β 5 ∆insth i
In the above equation, the variable ∆P P Strend controls for unobserved factors in the contracting environment such as the general trend of changes in CEO incentives, which may affect the CEO incentives of the subjects. Because we are using differenced variables in the specification, the effect of the unobserved firm-specific time-invariant factors is eliminated. Equation (6) thus provides one alternative way to resolve the endogeneity of credit rating changes. We separately estimate equation (6) for the downgrading firms and upgrading firms. In this specification, the intercept β 0 is the coefficient of interest, characterizing the impact of rating changes on CEO incentives after controlling for other factors that determine CEO incentives. Table 6 , Columns (1) and (2) present the regression results for downgrading firms up to two years after credit downgrading. The estimated parameters for the intercept, β 0 , in the one-year and two-year periods are 1.17 and 1.47, respectively, and both are significant at the 10% level.
Consistent with the above evidence, these estimation results suggest that credit rating downgrades bring about an immediate increase in CEO incentives and such an increase lasts beyond the oneyear horizon. Similarly, Columns (1') and (2)' report the regression results for upgrading firms.
The estimates of the intercept, β 0 , in the one-year and two-year periods are negative, and both are statistically insignificant. The results support our above weak evidence that credit rating upgrades lead to reduced CEO incentives.
Series of rating changes and other robustness checks
A firm may go through a series of rating changes either within a year or within several years, both of which could potentially affect our results. For the former case, we need to access the credit rating data at the monthly/quarterly/semiannual frequency, if available, to identify whether we include such firms in our balanced sample. Because we use the annual data here, we adopt an indirect way to address this problem. We suspect the magnitude of rating changes for firms experiencing several rating changes within a fiscal year to exceed three notches. In this balanced sample, we have five firms with the magnitude of Change larger than three in the event year t. We either truncate or winsorize the ten observations, the five subjects plus their controls, and we obtain quantitatively similar results. Table 7 , Column (1) shows the estimation results when we delete the ten observations from our balanced sample. The estimated coefficient on Change is 4.308 with a standard error of 1.769, which is significant at the 5% level.
For the latter case, if a firm experiences one or more than one rating changes after the rating change in the event year t, we drop the firm and the corresponding control firm from our balanced sample. We repeat our above analysis on such refined sample, and again, we find similar results. For example, Table 7 , Column (2) presents the estimation results when we exclude from our balanced sample the firms that experience at least another rating change, beyond the change in the event year t, in the period from year t-1 through year t+2. As a result, we lose 171 pairs of subjects and controls, or 342 observations in total. The estimated coefficient on Change is 3.903 with a standard error of 1.416, and the estimate is significant at the 1% level.
One may suspect that our main results may be driven by firms whose ratings are either downgraded from the investment grade to speculative grade and/or by firms whose ratings upgraded from the speculative grade to investment grade. In our balanced sample, we have 19 firms that lose their investment grades to speculative grades and 9 firms that get their credit ratings lifted to the investment grades in the event year t. After dropping those 28 subjects and their controls from our balanced sample, we obtain quantitatively similar results again. Table 7 , Column (3) reports the estimation results when we delete these 28 firms and their corresponding controls from our balanced sample. The estimated coefficient on Change is 3.866 with a standard error of 1.872, and the estimate is significant at the 5% level.
Discussions
The empirical evidence documented in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 shows that credit rating downgrades lead to much improved CEO incentives. There is some weak evidence that credit upgrades reduce CEO incentives. Our results are quite robust to model specifications and sample constructions. Our findings are clearly inconsistent with the risk-incentive-tradeoff-based argument. Although credit rating downgrades are typically associated with heightened default risk, we find that CEO incentive levels actually increase following credit downgrades. Similarly, credit upgrades imply reduced risk, but our analysis suggests declined CEO incentives after credit rating upgrades. Our evidence is not consistent with another aspect of the principal-agent models, the information-dissemination-based argument (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993), either. Because both credit upgrades and downgrades are well-disseminated information events, this information-dissemination-based argument predicts that the principals are able to leverage newly released information to better motivate CEOs and cause improved CEO incentives. If this line of reasoning stands valid, we expect to observe improved CEO incentives subsequent to either rating downgrades or rating upgrades, which is clearly inconsistent with our findings.
Our empirical evidence lends support to the corporate-governance-based argument. Credit rating changes potentially complement incentive pay schemes as one important corporate governance mechanism. In the case of credit rating downgrades, the CEOs, out of concern that they may lose their private control benefits, firm-specific human capital investment, and reputation in the labor market, may choose to align their own interest more closely with the shareholders' interests.
Moreover, in the case of rating downgrades, public attentions are drawn to the firms, CEOs' quiet lives are disrupted, and various corporate governance mechanisms, such as buildup of institutional pressure and tightening of board monitoring, are triggered to play much more effective roles. As a result, the levels of CEO incentives increase. In the case of rating upgrades, CEO incentives may decrease for several reasons. Second, credit rating upgrades signal brighter prospects and less severe agency problems, and the principals thus may reduce their reliance on pay-for-performance compensation schemes to motivate the CEOs.
Cross-Sectional Analysis
The empirical evidence presented in Section 5 favors the corporate-governance-based argument. In this section we further examine through which corporate governance channels credit rating changes affect CEO incentives. Based on the corporate-governance-based argument, if credit rating changes indeed affect CEO incentives through various corporate governance channels, we expect such effects to be more conspicuous among firms with more severe agency problems and in more urgent need for external market discipline. We follow Core and Guay's (1999) method to construct the measure of distortions in CEO incentive contracts. Core and Guay set CEO equity incentives as a function of firm/CEO characteristics and interpret the fitted values and residuals of the model as proxies for the optimal equity incentive levels and the deviations from the optimal incentive levels, respectively. In a similar vein of spirits, we model a firm's optimal CEO incentive level in the benchmark year t−1 as follows:
We estimate equation (7) in cross-section and treat the fitted value as the optimal or target level of CEO incentives and the residual as the deviation from the optimal incentive level. To measure the degree of deviation, i.e., the degree in incentive distortion, we further take the absolute value of the residual and denote it by P P SDEV . A larger P P SDEV represents a more severe distortion in CEO incentives. For the measure of information asymmetry, we use probability of informed trading (PIN) developed by Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara (1996, 1997). A high PIN implies that a stock's trading is more likely to be driven by private information and the firm's shareholders might lack enough access to public information.
We calculate values of the above firm characteristics for each firm in our sample in the benchmark year t − 1, i.e., the year immediately before rating changes. Then, for ease of exposition, 10 we create a dummy variable for each characteristics variable; each dummy variable is set to one if its associated firm characteristics value is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Specifically, We specify the following model for our cross-sectional analysis:
where X is the set of dummy variables defined above, measuring firm-specific attributes in the benchmark year t − 1. In equation (8), the overall impact of rating changes on CEO incentives equals β 1 + γX; the parameter affiliated with the interaction term, γ, characterizes the marginal impact of credit rating changes on CEO incentives in different cross-sections, and is the parameter of our primary interest in this cross-sectional analysis. To address the endogeneity problem, we again perform the 2SLS estimation on the set of equations comprising equations (3) and (8). The first-stage regression is on equation (3) for the endogenous credit ratings change variable Change using the same set of instrument variables as in Section 4.2. The second-stage regression is on equation (8).
We report the second-stage regression results in Table 8 . In Columns (1) and (2), we use two different model specifications to examine the change in CEO incentives in the one-year period immediately after the ratings changes relative to the CEO incentives in the benchmark year.
Column (1) reports the estimation results when equation (8) only includes the dummy variable D P P SDEV that characterizes CEO incentive distortions. In this setup, the coefficient on the interaction term is estimated to be 6.120 with a standard error of 2.036 and is significant at the 1% level. The degree of distortions in CEO incentives has a significant role in the credit rating changes affecting CEO incentives. CEOs with more distorted incentives, hence firms with severe agency problems, are more responsive to credit rating changes than CEOs with less distorted incentives.
Given a one-notch downgrade in the credit rating, i.e., Change = 1, the average increase in CEO incentive level for the incentive-distorted firms (P P SDEV 0 = 1) exceeds the average increase in CEO incentive level for the other firms (P P SDEV 0 = 0) by $6.120. Moreover, the coefficient on Change is estimated to be only 0.047 and is not significant at all, suggesting that the credit rating changes have little impact on CEO incentives for firms with incentive-compatible contracts.
Combining the above two results, we conclude that there is a distinct difference in the impact of credit rating changes on CEO incentives between the firms with incentive-distorted contracts and the firms with incentive-compatible contracts and that credit rating changes affect CEO incentive primarily among firms with severe distortions in CEO incentive contracts. This evidence provides a direct support to our corporate-governance-based story for the impact of rating changes on CEO incentives.
To examine whether credit rating changes impact CEO incentives through other corporategovernance channels and, if yes, which corporate-governance channel plays the major role, we include into equation (8) In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 , we use the same two model specifications but examine the average changes in CEO incentives over the two-year period immediately after the ratings changes relative to the CEO incentives in the benchmark year. 11 When we extend the horizon for treatment effects to the two-year period after credit rating changes, we find largely similar results. Based on the above evidence, we are able to infer that the monitoring of the credit rating agency complements the executive compensation contracts to ameliorate the agency problem and incentivize CEOs to work for the interests of shareholders.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study an important, yet unaddressed, question at the confluence of executive compensation and credit rating literatures -do credit rating changes affect CEO incentives? We model credit rating changes and CEO incentives changes as two jointly endogenous processes, and we use a two-stage estimation approach with carefully chosen instrument variables to address the issue of endogeneity. We document strong evidence that credit rating downgrades significantly increase CEO equity-based incentives and weak evidence that credit rating upgrades reduce CEO incentives. We also report evidence that credit rating changes help to adjust CEO optimal incentive levels, especially for firms with mis-aligned CEO incentives. Such effects tend to be more pronounced when agency costs and, hence, the needs for more effective corporate governance mechanisms are greater. Overall, our findings favor a corporate-governance-based argument to account for the impact of credit rating changes on CEO incentives. Our analysis suggests that rating agencies' (or more broadly bondholders) monitoring helps discipline mangers and complement other corporate governance mechanisms to ameliorate agency conflicts. This paper introduces one new dimension into the traditional principal-agent model by emphasizing the roles of rating agencies (or more generally, debt holders).
Appendix: The PIN Measure
The P IN measure is based on the market microstructure model introduced in Easley and O'Hara (1992), where trades can come from liquidity traders or from informed traders. There are three types of players in the game, liquidity traders, informed traders, and market makers. The arrival rate of liquidity traders who submit buy orders is and that of liquidity traders who submit sell orders is also . Every day, the probability that an information event will occur is α, in which case the probability of bad news is δ and the probability of good news is (1 − δ). If an information event occurs, the arrival rate of informed traders is µ. Informed traders submit a sell order if they get bad news and a buy order if they get good news. Thus, on a day without information events which happens with probability (1 − α), the arrival rate of a buy order will be and the arrival rate of a sell order will also be . On a day with a bad information event (with probability αδ), the arrival rate of a buy order will be and the arrival rate of a sell order will be + µ. On a day with a good information event (with probability α(1 − δ)), the arrival rate of a buy order will be + µ and the arrival rate of a sell order will be . Let θ = ( , α, δ, µ). The likelihood function for a single trading day is given by:
where B is the number of buy orders and S is the number of sell orders in a single trading day.
The trade direction is inferred from intraday data based on the algorithm proposed in Lee and Ready (1991) .
Using the number of buy and sell orders in every trading day in a given year M = (B t , S t )
T t=1
and assuming cross-trading day independence, we can estimate the parameters of the model ( b , s , α, δ, µ) by maximizing the following likelihood function:
Thus, we estimate the probability of informed trading P IN by dividing the estimated arrival rate of informed trades by the estimated arrival rate of all trades:
Table 1 Distribution of ExecuComp Firms with S&P's Credit Ratings: 1992-2003
The table reports the distribution of credit ratings for firms jointly covered in Compustat and ExecuComp databases. We convert firms' S&P historical long-term domestic issuer credit ratings (data280) into the following cardinal scales: 1 for "AAA", 2 for "AA+", 3 for "AA", 4 for "AA-", and so on until 22 for "D". Panel A reports the distribution of credit ratings of firms (excluding unrated firms). For brevity we report the distribution based on broad rating measure which includes the minus, middle, and plus specifications for a particular rating. That is, a broad rating category of "AA" in this panel includes ratings of "AA+", "AA", and "AA-"; similar to the other broad rating measures. Panel B reports the distribution of credit rating changes. Panel C reports the distribution of subjects (rating-change firms) which have matched controls (no-rating-change firms) in the sense that each subject and its corresponding control have the same credit ratings and are in the same two-digit SIC industry in the year immediately prior to the rating changes.
Panel A. Distribution of (broad) credit ratings ∆PPS is the change of CEO incentives calculated as the PPS in the year immediately after the credit rating change minus the PPS in the year immediately prior to the credit rating change. Change measures the change in a firm's credit rating with the rating change date denoted by t. A positive (negative) change means downgrading (upgrading). In the first-stage regression (i.e., the second equation in the above system), Z refers to a set of ten instrumental variables, including the firm's level of credit rating in year t-1, lrate; firm size in year t-1, lsize; stock volatility in year t-1, lvol; the market-to-book ratio in year t-1, lmtb; the change of firm size from years t-1 to t, ∆Size0; the change of market-to-book ratio from years t-1 to t, ∆mtb0; the change of the ratio of net income to total sales from years t-1 to t, ∆profit0; the change of the ratio of total debt (long-term and short-term) to total equity from years t-1 to t, ∆lev0; the change of net-income-to-interestexpense ratio from years t-1 to t, ∆fcov0; and the change of stock volatility from years t-1 to t, ∆vol0. Coefficient estimates from the first-stage regressions are not reported for brevity. All monetary variables are in 1992 constant dollars. Panel A reports the OLS and IV estimates. The robust standard errors adjust for hetereoscedasticity and clustering of firms and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively. P-value refers to the probability of the F-statistic larger than relevant critical values. Panel B reports the results on the specification test of the IV estimation. We run an auxiliary regression of the residuals from the second-stage IV estimation against all the exogenous variables and the instrument variables used in the IV estimation to test the over-identifying restriction. ∆PPS is the change of CEO incentives calculated as the PPS after the credit rating change minus the PPS in the year immediately prior to the credit rating change. Change measures the change in a firm's credit rating with the rating change date denoted by t. A positive (negative) change means downgrading (upgrading). In the first-stage regression (i.e., the second equation in the above system), Z refers to a set of instrumental variables, including the firm's level of credit rating in year t-1, lrate; firm size in year t-1, lsize; stock volatility in year t-1, lvol; the market-tobook ratio in year t-1, lmtb; the change of firm size from years t-1 to t, ∆Size0; the change of market-to-book ratio from years t-1 to t, ∆mtb0; the change of the ratio of net income to total sales from years t-1 to t, ∆profit0; the change of the ratio of total debt (long-term and short-term) to total equity from years t-1 to t, ∆lev0; the change of net-income-to-interest-expense ratio from years t-1 to t, ∆fcov0; and the change of stock volatility from years t-1 to t, ∆vol0. Coefficient estimates from the first-stage regressions are not reported for brevity. All monetary variables are in 1992 constant dollars. In Columns (2), (3), and (4), ∆PPS is respectively defined as the average CEO incentive (PPS) in the two-year, three-year, and four-year periods after the credit rating change minus the CEO incentive level in year t-1. The explanatory variables used in the secondstage regression (i.e., the first equation in the above system) are accordingly defined and lagged by one period. E.g., ∆Size in Column (1) is defined as the firm size in t minus the firm size in t-1, and ∆Size in Columns (2)-(4) are computed as the average firm size over t through t+1 (Column (2)), t through t+2 (Column (3)), t through t+3 (Column (4)) minus the firm size in t-1, respectively. The robust standard errors adjust for hetereoscedasticity and clustering of firms and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively. P-value refers to the probability of the F-statistic of the second-stage regression larger than relevant critical values. 6 ∆INSTC+ε, where DOWN (UP) =1 if Change>0 (<0) and 0 otherwise, and ∆PPS is the change of CEO incentives calculated as the PPS after the credit rating change, with the rating change date denoted by t, minus the PPS in the year immediately prior to the credit rating change. In the first step, we estimate the following probit model: DOWN (UP) =θ 0 + θ 1 ∆Size+θ 2 ∆Vol+ θ 3 ∆mtb+θ 4 ∆INSTH+θ 5 ∆INSTC+τZ+δ. Z refers to a set of instrumental variables, including the firm's level of credit rating in year t-1, lrate; firm size in year t-1, lsize; stock volatility in year t-1, lvol; the market-to-book ratio in year t-1, lmtb; the change of firm size from years t-1 to t, ∆Size0; the change of market-to-book ratio from years t-1 to t, ∆mtb0; the change of the ratio of net income to total sales from years t-1 to t, ∆profit0; the change of the ratio of total debt (long-term and short-term) to total equity from years t-1 to t, ∆lev0; the change of net-income-to-interest-expense ratio from years t-1 to t, ∆fcov0; and the change of stock volatility from years t-1 to t, ∆vol0. Coefficient estimates from the first-stage estimation are not reported for brevity. All monetary variables are in 1992 constant dollars. In Columns (2), and (2)', ∆PPS is respectively defined as the average CEO incentive (PPS) in the two-year period after the credit rating change minus the CEO incentive level in year t-1. The explanatory variables used in the second-stage estimation (i.e., the first equation in the above system) are accordingly defined and lagged by one period. E.g., ∆Size in Column (1) is defined as the firm size in t minus the firm size in year t-1; ∆Size in Column (2) is computed as the average firm size over t through t+1 minus the firm size in t-1.
Columns (1)- (2) report results for the sub-sample of downgrading firms and their control firms, and Columns (1)'-(2)' report results for the sub-sample of upgrading firms and their control firms. The robust standard errors adjust for hetereoscedasticity and clustering of firms and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively. P-value refers to the probability of the χ 2 -statistic of the second-stage regression larger than relevant critical values.
Downgrading (DOWN)
Upgrading (UP) 6 ∆INSTC+ε.. Here, ∆PPS and ∆PPStrend are respectively the changes in CEO incentives (PPS) of treated firms (firms with bond rating changes) and their control firms (firms without bond rating changes), calculated as the PPS after the credit rating change minus the PPS in the year immediately prior to the credit rating change. The rating change date is denoted by t. Panel A and Panel B report the estimation results for the subsamples of downgrading firms and upgrading firms, respectively. In Columns (1) and (1)', ∆PPS is calculated as the PPS in year t+1 minus the PPS in year t-1. In Columns (2) and (2)', ∆PPS is defined as the average PPS over the two-year period after the credit rating change minus the PPS in year t-1. The corresponding ∆PPStrend is defined in the same way. The explanatory variables used in the regression are accordingly defined and lagged by one period. E.g., ∆Size in Column (1) is defined as the firm size in t minus firm size in t-1, and ∆Size in Columns (2) is computed as the average firm size over t through t+1 minus the firm size in t-1. The robust standard errors adjust for hetereoscedasticity and clustering of firms and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (twosided), respectively. Here, ∆PPS is the change of CEO incentives calculated as the PPS in year t+1 minus the PPS in year t-1, where a rating change, denoted by Change, occurs in year t. A positive (negative) change means downgrading (upgrading). In the first-stage regression (i.e., the second equation in the above system), Z refers to a set of instrumental variables, including the firm's level of credit rating in year t-1, lrate; firm size in year t-1, lsize; stock volatility in year t-1, lvol; the market-tobook ratio in year t-1, lmtb; the change of firm size from years t-1 to t, ∆Size0; the change of market-to-book ratio from years t-1 to t, ∆mtb0; the change of the ratio of net income to total sales from years t-1 to t, ∆profit0; the change of the ratio of total debt (long-term and short-term) to total equity from years t-1 to t, ∆lev0; the change of net-income-to-interest-expense ratio from years t-1 to t, ∆fcov0; and the change of stock volatility from years t-1 to t, ∆vol0. Coefficient estimates from the first-stage regressions are not reported for brevity. The explanatory variables used in the second-stage regression (i.e., the first equation in the above system) are lagged by one period. All monetary variables are in 1992 constant dollars. In Column (1) we restrict the magnitude of rating changes in year t not to exceed three notches. In Column (2) we exclude firms that experience at least another rating change, beyond the change in year t, in the period from year t-1 through year t+2. In Column (3) we delete firms that have ratings either upgraded from speculative to investment grades or downgraded from speculative to investment grades in year t. The robust standard errors adjust for hetereoscedasticity and clustering of firms and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (twosided), respectively. P-value refers to the probability of the F-statistic of the second-stage regression larger than relevant critical values. ∆PPS is the change of CEO incentives calculated as the PPS after the credit rating change minus the PPS in the year immediately prior to the credit rating change. Change measures the change in a firm's credit rating with the rating change date denoted by t. A positive (negative) change means downgrading (upgrading). In the first-stage regression (i.e., the second equation in the above system), Z refers to a set of instrumental variables, including the firm's level of credit rating in year t-1, lrate; firm size in year t-1, lsize; stock volatility in year t-1, lvol; the market-tobook ratio in year t-1, lmtb; the change of firm size from years t-1 to t, ∆Size0; the change of market-to-book ratio from years t-1 to t, ∆mtb0; the change of the ratio of net income to total sales from years t-1 to t, ∆profit0; the change of the ratio of total debt (long-term and short-term) to total equity from years t-1 to t, ∆lev0; the change of net-income-to-interest-expense ratio from years t-1 to t, ∆fcov0; and the change of stock volatility from years t-1 to t, ∆vol0. The symbol X represents a set of dummy variables that capture firm-specific attributes in the benchmark year t-1 such as firm size (D_SIZE), credit rating level (D_GRADE), the degree of information asymmetry (D_PIN), the presence of institutional investors (D_INSTH), and the degree of distortion in CEO incentive contracts (D_PPSDEV). Each dummy variable is set to one if its associated firm characteristic value is larger than the sample median, and zero otherwise. All monetary variables are in 1992 constant dollars. Coefficient estimates from the first-stage regressions are not reported for brevity. In Columns (1) and (2), ∆PPS is defined as the average CEO incentive (PPS) in the one-year period immediately after the credit rating change minus the CEO incentive level in year t-1. In Columns (3) and (4), ∆PPS is defined as the average CEO incentive (PPS) in the two-year period after the credit rating change minus the CEO incentive level in year t-1. The explanatory variables used in the second-stage regression (i.e., the first equation in the above system) are accordingly defined and lagged by one period. E.g., ∆Size in Columns (1) and (2) is defined as the firm size in t minus the firm size in t-1, and ∆Size in Columns (3)-(4) are computed as the average firm size over t through t+1 minus the firm size in t-1. The robust standard errors adjust for hetereoscedasticity and clustering of firms and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively. P-value refers to the probability of the F-statistic of the second-stage regression larger than relevant critical values.
